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In many countries, unreliable inputs, particularly those lacking storage, can significantly limit a firm's
productivity. In the case of an increasing frequency of blackouts, a firm may change factor shares
in a number of ways. It may decide to self generate electricity, to purchase intermediate goods that
it used to produce directly, or to improve its technical efficiency. We examine how industrial firms
responded to China's severe power shortages in the early 2000s. Fast-growing demand coupled with
regulated electricity prices led to blackouts that varied in degree over location and time. Our data consist
of annual observations from 1999 to 2004 for approximately 32,000 energy-intensive, enterprises from
all industries. We estimate the losses in productivity due to factor-neutral and factor-biased effects
of electricity scarcity. Our results suggest that enterprises re-optimize among factors in response to
electricity scarcity by shifting from energy (both electric and non-electric sources) into materials---a
shift from "make" to "buy." These effects are strongest for firms in textiles, timber, chemicals, and
metals. Contrary to the literature, we do not find evidence of an increase in self generation. Finally,
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Resource availability and input reliability shape productivity, especially in developing coun-
tries. For some resources like water, storage devices can be used to manage unreliable services
(Baisa et al. 2010). However, electricity requires that agents respond in other ways, as power
is prohibitively expensive to store. A common response to sustained power supply issues is
for ￿rms to invest directly in self-generation technology.1 By crowding out other investment
opportunities, blackouts reduce productivity (Reinikka and Svensson 2002).2 In contrast
to the literature, this paper examines how the onset of blackouts a⁄ect productivity in an
immense and rapidly-growing economy, namely China. Using enterprise-level panel data,
we study how ￿rms respond to blackouts and estimate the resulting lost productivity and
environmental e⁄ects.
In the early 2000s, industrial customers in nearly every province in China experienced
blackouts associated with resource scarcity (IEA 2006).3 Despite e⁄orts to build new power
plants at a rapid rate, double-digit economic growth has lead to a tight market. Furthermore,
retail electricity remains under price-cap regulation with limited price response to shortages.
Finally, residential and commercial electricity consumers were given priority over industrial
customers. While historic in the magnitude of blackouts, this remains a major concern for
China. As recently as the summer of 2011, China faced substantial power shortages.4 The
severity of these blackouts dwarfs recent experiences in the United States. In 2004, China￿ s
Eastern electricity grid (an area including Shanghai) alone curtailed over 13,000,000 MWh,
accounting for over two percent of annual consumption. In comparison, the rolling blackouts
of California￿ s crisis in 2000-2001 curtailed less than one 1000th that amount.5
1Alby, Detherier, and Straub (2011) ￿nd self generation increases with power outages, using ￿rm-level
data from over 80 countries. Similarly, Reinikka and Svensson (2002) ￿nd that ￿rms invest in their own
power generators when Ugandan electric power supply is unreliable and inadequate. For a review of the
literature on the economic costs of blackouts, see Jyoti, Ozba￿ i, and Jenkins (2006).
2Recent papers show that public provision of electricity a⁄ects growth by improving labor productivity
(Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham 2011) and by increasing rural female employment (Dinkelman 2011).
3In 2003 and 2004, most service reliability problems were due to resource issues (Chen and Jia 2006).
4Shanghai Securities News (http://english.cnstock.com/enghome/homeheadline/201105/1307904.htm ac-
cessed December 19, 2011).
5Eastern China uses 2.5 times as much electricity as California. Curtailment data are from
1Facing blackouts, ￿rms may respond in several ways. First, they may decide to use
self-generated electricity. Second, they may decide to outsource the production of energy-
intensive, intermediate goods rather than produce them directly.6 Third, they might invest
in more energy-e¢ cient technology. Any of these three responses may lead to losses in total
factor productivity. In addition, if changing inputs is too costly in the short run, then ￿rms
may experience factor-neutral losses in productivity.
In China, about 80% of generation capacity is coal-￿red. Therefore, power shortages are
likely to reduce coal-related pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter,
and carbon dioxide. On the other hand, if ￿rms self generate in response to shortages, this
will increase diesel consumption. In particular, these small generators tend to be less e¢ cient
and more likely to be located close to urban areas. Thus, the net environmental e⁄ect of
blackouts is ambiguous.
We examine these productivity and environmental e⁄ects by combining data on annual
enterprise-level production and energy use with data on annual regional electricity scarcity.
The data comprise an unbalanced panel of approximately 32,000 enterprises in 11 industries
from 1999-2004. We estimate a cost function that incorporates a measure of electricity
scarcity.
The results suggest that enterprises re-optimize in response to electricity scarcity. Pri-
marily, they shift from energy expenditures (from both electric and non-electric, primary
energy sources) into material expenditures. This is consistent with the hypothesis of out-
sourcing: enterprises in regions where power became scarcer shift from ￿make￿to ￿buy￿in
obtaining intermediate goods. When estimated by industry, we ￿nd the largest e⁄ects for
textiles, timber (e.g., furniture), chemicals, and metals. Further, we do not ￿nd evidence
that electricity scarcity led to an increase in self generation. This is in contrast to the ￿nd-
ings from papers that study countries with long term electricity supply issues. We conclude
that blackouts were costly to ￿rms, with the costs increasing by 9% to 22% due to factor
China￿ s Eastern Grid Company (personal communication) and the California Public Utilities Commission
(http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/misc/generation+report.pdf accessed June 20, 2008), respectively.
6This relates to literatures on supply-chain management (de Kok and Graves 2003) and on second sourcing
in the face of uncertainty (Dick 1992).
2biases alone. We ￿nd that these productivity changes, while costly to ￿rms, led to small
reductions in carbon emissions.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the causes of and regulatory
response to the Chinese power shortage. Section 3 provides a theoretical model of how
￿rms may respond to issues of resource adequacy. Sections 4 and 5 describe our data and
empirical model, respectively. In Section 6, we report our results. We estimate the overall
productivity losses and environmental e⁄ects attributable to the power shortages in Section
7, and conclude in Section 8.
2 Background
Over the past few decades, investment in the Chinese power sector has experienced a boom-
bust cycle (Fisher-Vanden 2009). Starting in 1985, the central government transferred own-
ership of power plants to local governments and ￿rms. At ￿rst, this ￿privatization￿provided
suppliers with incentive to invest in new capacity. In fact, the rapid increase in new power
plant construction during the 1990s lead to a glut of capacity (IEA 2006). In response, the
national government imposed a building moratorium on new power plants in 1999.
However, within just a few years, the excess supply had disappeared. From 2000 to 2007,
demand for electric power grew 41% (EIA 2009). Most of this growth can be attributed to the
manufacturing sector, particularly in construction-related products like steel and cement. By
2006, the manufacturing sector comprised 74% of total electricity consumption (NBS 2007).
In addition, while a smaller overall share, household demand has been growing about 12%
per year. Power availability and reliability was further aggravated during the early 2000s by
unusually hot summers and cold winters, extreme weather events such as snow storms in the
mid South, and a shortage in coal supply (Lin et al. 2005, Wang 2007). As a result, 26 of
the 30 Chinese provinces experienced blackouts associated with resource scarcity issues from
2002 to 2004.
The government utilized numerous mechanisms in response to these shortages. First, they
instituted dynamic pricing mechanisms to smooth the load between peak and o⁄-peak times.
3For example, Jiangsu province implemented time-of-use pricing starting in 2003. However,
their e⁄ectiveness was limited by regulatory control on prices and the slow installation of
real-time meters. In addition, the government reduced subsidies for some industries. In the
mid 1980s, the national government began subsidizing purchased power for energy-intensive
industries including aluminum, cement, steel, and other metal and non-metal manufactur-
ing.7 Starting in 2002, rates increased for many of these industries.
The government also implemented supply-side policies to expand generation. The Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission authorized the construction of new power plants
and the expansion of the grid system, all backed by favorable ￿nancing packages o⁄ered
through the state-owned banks. However, given the long construction cycle, the e⁄ects of
these supply-side e⁄orts were not felt immediately. As discussed in Section 5, we account
for these demand and supply market-based responses. Namely, we are interested in the pri-
vate industrial costs and the environmental external costs of blackouts (or more generally,
regulatory-induced scarcity) rather than the overall energy costs of meeting demand growth.
Presumably, these blackouts would not have occurred in a free market, whereby prices could
adjust to clear the market.
However, prices did not increase to the equilibrium level. As a result, quota rationing and
rolling blackouts were the most widely used mechanism to address these shortages. Planned
outages and changes in production schedules were imposed to deal with the shortages. For
example, in the summer of 2003, the city of Hangzhou implemented a detailed plan for rolling
blackouts for industrial customers. These measures include: shifting enterprises with non-
continuous production to alternative working days (such as working for three days a week);
controlling and cutting o⁄electricity consumption at continuous production enterprises dur-
ing peak hours; moving energy-intensive production to night hours; limiting power supply
to key enterprises and projects; and lowering electricity consumption of commercial users.
The cities of Nanjing, Shanghai, and Shantou also released similar plans in that period.
7The fertilizer and agriculture are the most heavily subsidized industries. In 1999, ￿rms in these industries
in Junan Province paid about a quarter the rate of commercial users. Even during the crisis, these industries
continued to receive extremely low rates.
4Electricity is the dominant source of energy in the manufacturing sector, comprising more
than 40% of primary energy consumption in the sector while coal is approximately 25%. As
a result, the manufacturing sector is extremely vulnerable to shortages in electricity supply.
Depending upon a ￿rm￿ s ability to substitute to alternative forms of energy, this reliance on
electricity may result in manufacturing ￿rms taking the full brunt of electricity shortages.
For example, extra costs may be incurred due to the need to re-arrange production
schedules. Alternatively, ￿rms may choose to self generate which will require additional
capital and diesel purchases.8 This may particularly be true for industries at the top of
the rolling blackouts list. During these periods of shortages, many light industries, such as
food processing or textiles, were among the ￿rst to face electricity quotas. Many of these
enterprises were reported to be working only four days a week or working during o⁄-peak
hours (Natural Resources Defense Council 2003, World Bank 2005, Thompson 2005).
News reports suggested large economic costs as a result of these blackouts. Many of these
reports were based on isolated case studies or surveys. For example, Zhejiang Province in the
Eastern Pearl River Delta reported costs related to blackouts during 2004 to be 100 billion
RMB, or 9% of gross regional product.9 Lin et al. (2005) survey enterprises and estimate
the marginal cost of an hour of outage to be 78,482 RMB or 10,000 US dollars.
3 Theory
We de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s problem as one of constrained optimization. We assume that a ￿rm￿ s
output y is generated by the production function, y = f(k;l;m;e;n;￿), with inputs of
k capital, l labor, m material, e electricity, and n other energy (such as coal, oil, and
natural gas). Denote the probability of a blackout ￿, which measures resource inadequacy
or unreliability. First consider reliable electricity: i.e., ￿ = 0. For a given set of input prices,
8Rosen and Houser (2007) and IEA (2006) reported that some ￿rms and residents installed diesel-powered
self-generation in response to the scarcity. This led to a 16% increase in oil demand in 2004, accounting for
27% of the increase in world oil demand in that year.
9Chinese Business Times. (Dec. 12, 2004) http://￿nance.sina.com.cn/g/20041222/03001241424.shtml1.
Accessed April 14, 2007.
5de￿ne the dual unconstrained cost function as:
cu = cu(pk;pl;pm;pe;pn;y) (1)
Shephard￿ s Lemma implies factor demand: x￿ = @c=@px; where x = k;l;m;e;n. Assuming
a log-linear form of the production function (such as Cobb-Douglas or translog),
lncu = lncu(pk;pl;pm;pe;pn;y) (2)











; x = k;l;m;e;n: (3)
Now suppose there is some probability, ￿ > 0, that electricity is unreliable. In particular,
let b e be the constrained level of electricity associated with periodic blackouts: 0 ￿ b e < e￿.
In this constrained case, the cost function is therefore,
lncc = lncc(pk;pl;pm;pe;pn;y;b e); (4)
where the price of electricity does not enter into the ￿rm￿ s marginal decisions as a result of
the constraint on electricity availability (even though it enters into (4)). For a risk neutral
￿rm, the expected log cost function for producing a given amount y is:
E[lnc(y)] = ￿lncc(y) + (1 ￿ ￿)lncu(y): (5)
The e⁄ect on total factor productivity (TFP) is therefore likely to be harmful. Costs increase
as the constraint on electricity limits a ￿rm￿ s choices:
@E[lnc]
@￿
= lncc(y) ￿ lncu(y) > 0: (6)
In order to determine the e⁄ect of blackouts on the expected value shares, i.e., vshx ￿
pxx=c, we compute the partial derivative of (3) with respect to ￿. For electricity, this is
















6For the other inputs, the sign depends on whether the input is a substitute or complement
of electricity.
Firms may decide to use self-generated electricity once blackouts become more common.
This would result in an increase in the ￿rm￿ s use of other energy sources, such as diesel oil,













Another response to blackouts may be to outsource a portion of production. Firms may
decide to purchase intermediate goods rather than produce these goods from raw materials.
In this case, materials would be a substitute for electricity: @ lncc=@ lnpm > lncu=@ lnpm.
In addition, outsourcing could result in less use of labor, capital, and other energy sources in
the production of these intermediate goods. For example, a ￿rm requiring steel as an input
to production may either purchase the raw inputs (e.g., pig iron, coal and electricity) to
manufacture steel on site, or the ￿rm may decide to purchase the steel from other producers,
especially if electricity is unreliable. In this case, as these other inputs are not longer needed
due to outsourcing, these inputs would be complements of electricity.
Finally, ￿rms may respond to the shortage of electricity by improving their overall energy
e¢ ciency. This would especially be the case if there were policies promoting energy e¢ ciency
at the regional level. In this case, the value share of capital would likely increase while the
shares of electricity and other energy inputs would fall.
Four hypotheses emerge from the theoretical discussion above:
I. Decreased Productivity: From equation (6), we expect that black-
outs will increase total costs.
II. Self Generation: One possible response to blackouts would be for
the ￿rm to self generate. This would imply a substitution away from electricity
toward non-electric energy and capital.
III. Outsourcing: Another possible response to blackouts would be for
the ￿rm to outsource more and thus produce less in-house. This would imply
more material use and less use of the other factors of production.
7IV. E¢ ciency: Lastly, blackouts may induce more energy e¢ ciency,
which would reduce both types of energy and increase capital.
4 Data
This paper uses three National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data sources from 1999 to 2004.
Each year, the NBS￿ s Department of Industrial and Transportation Statistics (DITS) col-
lects annual economic data for approximately 22,000 large and medium-size enterprises.
These data include labor and capital expenditures, and other similar economic and ￿nancial
variables (Fisher-Vanden and Je⁄erson 2008). DITS collects another data set for a subset
(about 7500 each year) of these enterprises that measures annual expenditures and aggregate
quantities of consumption for various energy types. We separate purchased electricity from
non-electric energy consumption. We also identify self-generated power.
Note that the set of 22,000 enterprises the DITS surveys changes annually. A balanced
panel would consist of only 1340 enterprises. We opt to use the much larger, full sample of
approximately 45,000 observations from 32,000 enterprises, as the unbalanced nature of our
panel is primarly due to the repeated cross section nature of the sampling and not due to
actual entry and exit. We test the robustness of our results by using the balanced sample.
The combined data expand the set of factor inputs to capital, labor, energy, and mate-
rials (KLEM). By exploring beyond the conventional capital-labor substitution possibilities,
we are able to examine the heterogeneity in factor biases from electricity shortages. The
inclusion of energy in our data set allows us to explore the e⁄ects of electricity shortages on
energy use and carbon dioxide emissions.
Table 1 reports our sample￿ s share of all industrial activity over 1999-2004. Our data in-
clude only the most energy-intensive enterprises among the population of large and medium-
size enterprises (LMEs) over the years 1999-2004. It comprises just 3% of all Chinese en-
terprises. However, the KLEM sample accounts for most of the industrial energy consumed
(59%), and notable shares of industrial sales (38%), employment (31%), and assets (20%).
Table 2 reports quartiles of the enterprise-year observations for several variables of inter-
8est, including factor shares. We report summary statistics for input prices, which are just
expenditure averages. We de￿ne the price of labor as the wage bill (plus welfare payments)
divided by total employees. The price of ￿xed assets is total value added (less labor ex-
penses) divided by net value ￿xed assets. The price of energy is calculated as total energy
expenditures divided by the quantity of energy purchased in standard coal equivalent (SCE).
Finally, the price of materials is calculated as the weighted average of industry prices using
input-output shares from national accounts. Due to concerns over measurement error, we
also examine using regional average input prices in Section 6.
For each industry, Table 3 reports factor intensities for capital, labor, materials, elec-
tricity and non-electricity energy. We classify 12 industries: mining, food, textiles, timber,
petroleum products, chemicals, rubber, non-metal mineral products, metal products, ma-
chinery, electric power, and other industries.10 Not surprisingly, relative to the distribution
for the total population of enterprises and for just the LMEs, the energy sample includes high
proportions of enterprises in the more energy-intensive industries, including the petroleum,
electric power, non-metal products, and chemical industries. In the analysis, we omit the
electric power industry.
The NBS data set also classi￿es enterprises into seven ownership classi￿cations, consisting
of state-owned enterprises and the six other non-state classi￿cations. In 1999, our sample
is largely concentrated in the state-owned sector, i.e., 62% of total sales in our sample
originated with SOEs. This SOE ownership prevalence in our sample is not surprising: a
large portion of China￿ s energy-intensive enterprises that occupy the capital-intensive sectors
are state-owned. In Section 6, we examine whether ownership a⁄ects how ￿rms responded
to blackouts.
10While NBS classi￿es ￿rms into 37 categories, some have insu¢ cient observations to estimate the e⁄ects
by industry.
9Measures of Electricity Scarcity
In 2002, China had six main regional grids￿ Central, East, North, Northeast, Northwest,
South￿ each encompassing several provinces.11 Within each grid, the transmission of power
is frequent and with minimal congestion. However, in the absence of long distance trans-
mission DC lines, the transfer of electric power among grids has been di¢ cult. As a result,
in tight markets, provinces are able to provide power to other provinces located within the
same regional grid through load management, but the sharing of power across grids to meet
peak demand is, in most cases, impossible. Grid level performance indicators are, therefore,
a meaningful way to measure the extent of power system reliability, or scarcity, within a
region.
We use data on electricity shortages constructed from information obtained from various
issues of the China Electricity Yearbook. These Yearbooks contain information on electricity
generation (GenThermal
gt ) and capacity (CapThermal
gt ) from thermal (primarily coal-￿red) power
plants. Our main measure of scarcity is the thermal utilization rate for grid g at time t:
Sgt = GenThermal
gt =(8760￿CapThermal
gt (1￿sor ￿for)), where sor is the scheduled outage rate
and for is the forced outage rate.12 Power plants typically scheduled outages for maintenance
and reliability purposes, sor. In addition, unscheduled outages occur due to equipment
failure, for. Thus, the factor (1 ￿ sor ￿ for) adjusts for the probability of operation.
Scarcity issues are greater in the North and East grids most years, and tend to increase over
time in all grids (see Figure 1).
For robustness checks, we also calculate two alternative measures of scarcity.13 Although
di⁄erences do exist among the three scarcity measures, the trends of these measures are
similar. As the market got tighter after 2002, all three measures point to a higher probability
11Grid systems in Xizang (Tibet) and Taiwan are not connected with China￿ s national grid system.
12Our measures of these rates are constant over time and location. They are based on the data from the
2000 Yearbook on the scheduled and non-scheduled outage hours for thermal generators of at least 100 MW.
13The overall utilization rate, STotal
gt is GenTotal
gt =[8760 ￿ CapTotal
gt (1 ￿ sor ￿ for)]. This is not the main




gt (1 ￿ for)], where the adjustment factor is (1 ￿ for) excludes scheduled outages,
which are unlikely to be during peak periods. This measures scarcity during the hour when the market is
nearest capacity limits.
10of the occurrence of blackouts.
These measures were also a¢ rmed by system operators in the Eastern Grid at interviews
during ￿eld work in 2007.14 For this grid, we have additional data on the length and quantity
of electricity interruptions. The correlation between the annual MWh curtailed and our main
scarcity measure is 0.41.15 Note that with annual data we are unable to examine the impact of
duration, frequency, and timing of the interruptions which may a⁄ect the cost of production
and the response of the enterprise.
Measures of Self Generation
In our analysis of self generation, we measure the rate variable as the percentage of energy
used to generate electricity as a share of total energy consumption. We also use an indicator
variable denoting any self generation. About 7% of the sample self generate. Most self
generation uses diesel while conventional power plants in China use coal and hydropower.
As Southern China is farther from the northern coal mines and has little hydropower, it is
not surprising that this region has a greater share of enterprises that self generate. The share
of enterprises that self generate do not vary systematically over time for any region.
In this analysis, we examine whether industries that are more electricity intensive are
more or less likely to self generate when scarcity increases. We de￿ne an indicator variable for
electricity-intensive industries that includes chemicals, non-metal products, metal products,
mining, and other industries (see Table 3).
Measures of Outsourcing
In the ￿nal empirical section, we test for direct evidence of ￿rms outsourcing. To do this,
we use two data sources: the two-digit SIC code input/output matrix from the national
accounts, and data on distances between each province. We then create an inverse-distance
14Interviewees suggested two additional measures for scarcity: a national, reliability index based on
brownouts data in the electricity yearbooks; and the Eastern grid￿ s data on interruptions. Neither has
the regional variation and completeness of the three mentioned above.
15The correlation between annual curtailment and aggregate consumption is very high, 0.9. This may
indicate that some new capacity may not have been available in the reported year.





j=1(1=dij), where n is the number of
provinces and dij is the distances between provinces i and j.
We also create an industry outsourcing variable. First, we use our industry-speci￿c
estimates of how material shares respond to scarcity, ￿
k
m (see discussion of Table 5 below).
Second, for each input industry, we sum over the product of the input-output value shares








it and ￿k to measure outsourcing. This captures when a ￿rm is in an industry
whose products are used by other ￿rms that are both (i) located in a region with scarcity
issues and (ii) respond to greater scarcity by increasing their materials cost shares.
5 Empirical Model of Productivity
We examine the productivity response to blackouts by measuring both factor-neutral and
factor-biased e⁄ects. We specify a translog cost function to measure productivity changes.
For ￿rm i, input factor j, industry k, electricity grid g, and year t, we estimate the following
equation:
lncit = f(Qit;pijt) = ￿0 lnSgt + ￿1 lnQit lnSgt + ￿j lnpijt lnSgt + ￿j lnpijt (9)










+￿j lnQit lnpijt + ￿i + ￿kt + "it
where cit are total production costs, Qit is the gross value of industrial output (in constant
prices), pijt is factor price j (where j is ￿xed assets, labor, materials, electricity, or other
energy), and Sgt measures electricity scarcity.
Parameters ￿0 and ￿1 measure the factor-neutral e⁄ect of scarcity (allowing the e⁄ect to
vary by Qit), while ￿j measure the factor-biased e⁄ects of scarcity. The null hypothesis is
that production is not a⁄ected by scarcity either through factor adjustments or by making
overall factor-neutral changes; i.e., ￿0 = 0, ￿1 = 0, and ￿j = 0.
12For each factor input, we also estimate a value share equation based on (3):





’jl lnpilt + ￿j lnQit + ￿it; for all j: (10)
Because equations (9) and (10) represent a system of equations in which shocks to the
factor shares are likely to be correlated across the error structure of the model and to gain
e¢ ciency in the estimation, we estimate them as seemingly-unrelated regressions (SUR).16
To ensure that the coe¢ cients exhibit the usual properties of symmetry and homogeneity of



















￿j = 0: (11)
First we estimate the aggregate e⁄ect of scarcity on production. Then we test for heteroge-
neous e⁄ects by separately estimating these equations by industry.
Endogeneity Issues
Economists typically estimate these types of e⁄ects with either production or cost functions.
Both approaches may have to address concerns of endogeneity. In estimating production
functions, some input quantities are simultaneously determined. Instead, we use the cost
function approach that requires considering the endogeneity of output.
In examining endogeneity, we began by exploring potential instruments that proxy for
demand shifters. While there are not a plethora of publicly available Chinese data sets, we
were able to measure provincial annual population and income. Unfortunately, the ￿rst stage
was weak. Instead, we assume that ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (￿i) and industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects (￿kt)
address most of the endogeneity concerns regarding output.17
We also examine the endogeneity of scarcity. In particular, we explore whether scarcity
may be caused by greater industrial activity, in particular from more electricity-intensive
16In order to have an invertible disturbance covariance matrix, we drop the value share equation of materials
from the estimation. To test the robustness of results, we also drop the value share equation for capital in
the estimation, and estimate the model using two alternative scarcity measures described below.
17As a robustness, we also report a model where the dependent variable is the average costs (i.e., in
equation (9) we impose ￿1 = 0;￿ = 1;￿ = 0;￿ = 0).
13￿rms. We use instruments that will increase scarcity by increasing the demand for electricity
but not a⁄ect industrial output. The set of instruments are grid-level annual heating and
cooling degree days, as well as their interactions with factor prices.
Aggregate E⁄ects of Scarcity
Our cost function estimation allows us to compute the marginal and total e⁄ects of electricity
scarcity on cost and carbon emissions. The calculation of the marginal change in cost due












The ￿rst term captures the factor-neutral e⁄ects while the factor-biased e⁄ects are the re-
mainder.
The marginal e⁄ect of scarcity on emissions (E) is the product of the marginal change
in quantity of fuel input due to scarcity @xijt=@Sgt and the emissions rate rj, where x is



















Table 4 reports the main results from estimating (9) and (10). The ￿rst column reports our
main speci￿cation. The coe¢ cient on scarcity suggests that small enterprises facing greater
possibilities for electricity shortages saw a signi￿cantly negative neutral e⁄ect on cost. While
surprising, these cost savings dissipate with enterprise size (Qit) and are insigni￿cant for the
average enterprise. Therefore, our ￿rst hypothesis that scarcity will lead to a negative e⁄ect
on an enterprise￿ s productivity as a result of the constraint on electricity availability does
not hold on average.
14However, our results do suggest that scarcity has an e⁄ect on how enterprises produce;
namely, scarcity leads to signi￿cant substitutions among the ￿ve factor inputs. Increased
scarcity leads to a reduction in the use of electricity and other forms of energy and an
increase in the use of materials. For a one standard deviation increase in scarcity, the cost
share of materials increases by about one percent while that of electricity and other energy
each decrease by about half that amount. The e⁄ects on labor and capital are small.
This materials-using e⁄ect of scarcity suggests that enterprises are choosing to outsource
production rather than to produce in-house, consistent with our third hypothesis. We do
not, however, ￿nd evidence to support our hypothesis that electricity blackouts will lead to
greater self generation. We observe neither an increase in capital use, nor a substitution
toward other types of energy (in particular diesel oil) that would be consistent with self
generation. To the contrary, we see a signi￿cant reduction in non-electric energy. At ￿rst,
this e⁄ect on energy overall seems consistent with the hypothesis that blackouts lead to
energy e¢ ciency improvements. However, we do not see an increase in capital. Hence,
outsourcing appears the only hypothesis for which we ￿nd evidence.
The second column of Table 4 shows the results from our instrumental variables estima-
tion. We ￿nd in the ￿rst stage, the set of instruments to be strong predictors of scarcity.18
The second stage of the IV regression is reported in Table 4 and shows that the IV results are
similar in sign to those in column one. However, the magnitude of the e⁄ects on materials,
electricity and other energy are about twice as large.
Columns three and four restrict the main model. The third column imposes a constant
TFP e⁄ect for ￿rms of all sizes. Here, a signi￿cantly negative factor-neutral e⁄ect suggests
that ￿rms may have been pushed to reduce costs during times of scarcity. Finally, the last
column assumes constant returns to scale by imposing the constraints described in footnote
17. This is akin to modeling average costs as a function of scarcity. Columns 3 and 4 show
similar results to our main ￿ndings.
18A Wald test on the instruments￿joint signi￿cance for the ln(scarcity) regression, for instance, returns
an F-statistic of 882 (p-value < 0.001).
15Robustness
Table 5 reports our results when we estimate (9) and (10) separately for each industry. We
￿nd large responses in electricity shares for mining, textiles, timber, and metals. Timber
includes paper, pulp, and furniture. Interestingly, the industrial category ￿other￿shows an
increase in electricity, but no other signi￿cant changes in inputs making the result hard to
interpret. Outsourcing was large in a several sectors: textiles, timber, chemicals, nonmetals,
and metals. There were large decreases in other energy shares for mining, timber, chemicals,
and nonmetals. The one industry that reported using more energy was petroleum, which
may have had greater energy resources available. Most industries saw small or no changes
in capital and labor shares, with mining￿ s capital share being the exception.
Revisiting the four hypotheses from the theory section, we ￿nd evidence of outsourc-
ing in several industries. None of the industries had results consistent with self generation.
Factor-neutral e⁄ects were costly for petroleum. Small timber, rubber, and metal enter-
prises display negative factor-neutral e⁄ects, which is consistent with saving costs relative
to the industry average. Finally, mining and nonmetal industries results are consistent with
improved e¢ ciency.
We perform several other robustness checks. In estimating the model by region, given
the variation in our scarcity measure, we cannot include time ￿xed e⁄ects for each industry.
We ￿nd that most regions had signi￿cant changes in input shares. The northeast and
east experienced large drops in other energy shares. Electricity shares dropped in nearly
all regions. Conversely, material shares increased throughout the country except in the
southwest.
We also test whether ownership mattered. In particular, we separately estimate the
model for state-owned enterprises. Here we ￿nd a signi￿cant increase in capital shares (with
a coe¢ cient of 0.064 and standard error of (0.011)). Labor shares, factor-neutral TFP, and
￿rm size e⁄ects were small and insigni￿cant. We ￿nd qualitatively similar e⁄ects for materials
(0.033 (0.015)), electricity (-0.058 (0.009)), and non-electric energy (-0.034 (0.011)). These
results are consistent with outsourcing and with technical e¢ ciency. We test the robustness
16our results to several additional assumptions.19
Self Generation
As discussed above, our cost function results do not support the hypothesis that enterprises
chose to self generate in reaction to electricity shortages. We explore this further by using
a linear probability model of adoption decisions, where the dependent variable indicates self
generation. Using enterprise ￿xed e⁄ects, we ￿nd that scarcity and scarcity interacted with
an indicator of electricity-intensive industries are not signi￿cant predictors of self generation
(-0.045 (0.046) and -1.453 (1.129)).
If we exclude enterprise ￿xed e⁄ects, we can estimate a random e⁄ects probit model.
Here, more electricity-intensive industries do self generate in regions with greater scarcity.
The direct e⁄ect of scarcity is -2.28 (0.40) and the interaction term is 12.10 (4.63). Namely,
when we estimate a model using cross sectional variation, we do ￿nd a ￿long run￿e⁄ect.
However, when we look only at responses over time within an enterprise, we do not see a
￿short run￿e⁄ect. Finally, we examine the intensive usage of generation technology. We ￿nd
that the fraction of electricity that is self generated is not a⁄ected by the degree of scarcity
on the grid. This is the case both with a linear ￿xed e⁄ects model as well as a random e⁄ects
Tobit model.
Note that these e⁄ects are identi￿ed o⁄ of just a few years of data, right at the time
of the crisis. Installing new capital-intensive equipment might require more time to install.
Similarly, ￿rms may have been waiting to determine whether or not these blackouts would
become persistent: there was option value in waiting. Finally, while there were reports of
￿rms and residents installing self generation (Rosen and Houser 2007, IEA 2006), our sample
focuses on just the largest energy users. For these ￿rms, the costs of self supplying may have
been extremely large.
19The results are robust to dropping the capital equation instead of the materials equation. Results are
also robust to the two alternative measures of scarcity. We also ￿nd our results to be robust to using
province-year average input prices to address the concern that ￿rm-level input prices may be endogenous.
Finally, the results are robust to just using a balanced panel of enterprises.
17Outsourcing
Finally, we test for direct evidence of outsourcing by estimating whether a ￿rm￿ s production
increases when ￿rms it sells to are threatened by scarcity. We regress a ￿rm￿ s output (mea-
sured in constant-dollar gross value of industrial output) on ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects and industry-
year ￿xed e⁄ects. We also include three variables of interest: Sgt, Sout
it and Sout
it ￿k. Standard
errors are clustered by ￿rm.
The ￿rst variable, Sgt, shows that ￿rms reduce output when scarcity increases: -1.33
(0.64). The second variable, Sout
it , suggests (though is insigni￿cant) that ￿rms produce more
when neighboring regions have greater scarcity concerns: 3.18 (2.34).20 The last variable
implies that ￿rms outsource intermediate goods: 34.00 (18.14). This e⁄ect is weakly signif-
icant (p=0.06) when all three e⁄ects are jointly estimated. However, when just accounting
for Sgt and Sout
it ￿k, only the outsourcing e⁄ect is signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level: 37.50
(17.76).
7 The Private and External Costs of Shortages
Table 6 aggregates overall e⁄ects of scarcity on production costs and carbon emissions. We
calculate the marginal and total e⁄ects of changes in scarcity from 1999 to 2004 on cost and
emissions. In particular, the totals are the sum of the marginal e⁄ects for each enterprise
and year observation multiplied by the change in scarcity from 1999 for that observation.
Panel A provides marginal and total cost ￿gures calculated using sample averages and
at the enterprise-level. The sample average results suggest that electricity scarcities over
the period 2000-2004 lead to a slight, though insigni￿cant, increase in total costs. The
costly factor-biased e⁄ects (about 9%) exceeded the apparent cost savings from the neutral
e⁄ects (about 7%). Notably, materials costs increased substantially, with these cost increases
accounting for 10% of the total costs incurred by ￿rms in our sample from 2000 to 2010, as
enterprises shifted to outsourcing the production of intermediate products. The enterprise-
level calculations suggest that the factor-neutral e⁄ects were much smaller and that, overall,
20Note that when just the ￿rst two variables are included, Sout
it is weakly signi￿cant: 3.94 (2.27).
18costs increased by 20%.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the e⁄ect of scarcity on emissions. The sample average e⁄ects
￿nd no signi￿cant changes in emissions. However, the enterprise-level calculations suggest
that scarcities reduced emissions 11% due to non-electricity consumption. This discrep-
ancy between the average calculation and enterprise-level calculation suggests heterogeneous
e⁄ects in responding to scarcity. Note that these environmental e⁄ects are only for the
decreases in electricity and other energy consumption and do not factor in the additional
emissions due to outsourcing.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines how enterprises in China responded to a power shortage during the
early 2000s. We ￿nd that enterprises in regions with greater shortages decrease factor shares
of electricity and increase shares of materials. We do not ￿nd evidence of an increase of self
supply. In fact, we ￿nd an overall decrease in other non-electricity energy sources, suggesting
that these primary energy sources are complementary inputs in producing the intermediate
products that have been outsourced. We also ￿nd that enterprises facing higher levels of
scarcity became more capital intensive. This, coupled with the decrease in energy use,
suggests enterprises may have improved their energy e¢ ciency.
The overall e⁄ect of blackouts, which we proxy for with a measure of scarcity, was to
increase production costs. From 1999 to 2004, enterprises￿costs rose by 2-20%, primarily
due to factor substitution biases. The reduction in demand for electricity and other energy
sources, which are primarily coal, resulted in a decrease in emissions of up to 11% from these
facilities. However, the net e⁄ect on the environment is ambiguous as outsourcing likely
increases emissions from other facilities.
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The component, @xijt=@Sgt, can be derived from (10) and (12). From the value share equation


































































Rearranging, we obtain an expression for @xijt=@Sgt in terms of parameters and other known
measures such as the quantity of each factor. Multiplying this by the emissions rate yields
the marginal emissions of scarcity reported in equation (13), which converts energy quantities
to carbon emissions based on the carbon content of the speci￿c energy type j.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Sample Shares in Sales, Employment, Energy Consumption, and Enterprises 
 








Share of the 
Industry in the 
KLEM sample
 
       
Sales (100 million yuan)  114,701  64%  38% 
Employment (10,000 persons)




Assets (100 million yuan)
  148,144  72%  20% 
Energy consumption (10,000 
tons of standard coal (SCE))  130,119  70%
3  59% 
Number of Enterprises  182,236  13%  3% 
 
Notes: For a given row, percentages are of the annual average of total industry activity over our sample 
period, 1999 to 2004. LMEs are large and medium-size enterprises. KLEM sample is facilities for 
which we know capital, labor, energy, and materials. Assets are original value of fixed assets.  
1 Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2000 (NBS, 2000).  Industrial state-owned and non-state-owned 
with annual sales over 5 million yuan.   
2  Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2000 (NBS, 2000).  Industrial state-owned and non-state-
owned with annual sales over 30 million yuan, employment over 300 persons, and assets over 40 
million yuan. 
 
3  Due to lack of time series energy data for LME’s, these values only represent 1999 values, not an 






Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables  Description  N  25
th  50
th   75
th 
sales cost  sales cost (￥million)  45,056  59  121  294 
output  gross value of industrial output in constant prices (￥million)  45,056  59  130  316 
vshK  value share of capital (%)  45,056  10%  16%  24% 
vshL  value share of labor (%)  45,056  4%  6%  10% 
vshM  value share of materials (%)  45,056  51%  63%  73% 
vshElect  value share of electricity (%)  45,056  1%  3%  8% 
vshNelect  value share of non-electric energy (%)  45,056  1%  2%  9% 
pK  price of capital  45,056  0.18  0.38  0.83 
pL  price of labor (￥1000/person)  45,056  8.1  11.9  17.4 
pM  price of materials  45,056  88.1  91.1  94.5 
pElect  price of electricity (￥1000/mwh)  45,056  4.3  5.3  6.5 
pNelect  price of non-electric energy (￥1000/sce)  45,056  0.36  0.63  1.6 
scarcity  annual fossil generation over capacity (by grid, year)  36  0.53  0.59  0.61 
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Table 3: Average Value Shares by Industry for 1999 
 
Variables  2-digit SIC  Capital  Labor  Elect  Non-Elect   Materials 
Mining  06-10,12  10%  24%  10%  9%  47% 
Food and Beverage  13-16  18%  7%  3%  5%  67% 
 
Textile, Apparel, and 
Leather Products 
 
17-19  10%  11%  9%  4%  66% 
Timber, Furniture, and 
Paper Products  20-24  12%  9%  10%  8%  61% 
 
Petroleum Processing and 
Coking 
25  9%  4%  2%  40%  44% 
Chemicals  26-28  10%  7%  13%  13%  57% 
Rubber and Plastic 
Products  29-30  11%  8%  7%  5%  69% 
Non-Metal Products  31  11%  9%  13%  14%  53% 
Metal Processing and 
Products  32-34  7%  8%  10%  11%  64% 
Machinery, Equipment, 
and Instruments  35-37,39-42  2%  14%  6%  4%  74% 
Electric Power  44  22%  7%  3%  28%  40% 
Other Industry  43,45,46  19%  13%  13%  10%  45% 
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Table 4: The Cost of Electricity Reliability 
Variable  SUR     IV-SUR    No Interaction  Impose CRS 
ln(scarcity)  -1.461 **  -3.388 **  -0.266  ***  -0.257  *** 
  (0.568)   (1.413)   (0.081)    (0.081)   
ln(GVIO)*ln(scarcity)  0.101 **  0.269 **         
  (0.047)   (0.116)          
ln(P capital)*ln(scarcity)  0.002   0.006   0.002    0.006   
  (0.006)   (0.009)   (0.006)    (0.006)   
ln(wage)*ln(scarcity)  0.007 **  -0.024 ***  0.007  **  0.002   
  (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.003)    (0.003)   
ln(P materials)*ln(scarcity)  0.085 ***  0.188 ***  0.084  ***  0.094  *** 
  (0.009)   (0.012)   (0.009)    (0.009)   
ln(P electricity)*ln(scarcity)  -0.043 ***  -0.079 ***  -0.043  ***  -0.049  *** 
  (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.005)    (0.005)   
ln(P other energy)*ln(scarcity)  -0.050 ***  -0.091 ***  -0.050  ***  -0.054  *** 
  (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.006)    (0.006)   
                 
Average TFP Effect  -0.260   -0.189   -0.266    -0.257   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total costs. Regressions include enterprise fixed 
effects, industry*year fixed effects, and factor prices by year. Clustered standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. We denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) 
levels. Column (2) instruments for scarcity (and its interactions) using cooling degree days 
and heating degree days (and interactions with factor prices and ln(GVIO)).27 
 
Table 5: Industry-Specific Cost Effects of Electricity Reliability 
      ln(scarcity) ×    ln(scarcity) ×    ln(scarcity) ×    ln(scarcity) ×    ln(scarcity) ×    ln(scarcity) ×    Average 
Industry  ln(scarcity)    ln(GVIO)    ln(P capital)     ln(wage)     ln(P materials)     ln(P electricity)    ln(P other energy)    TFP Effect 
                               
Mining  -1.629   0.209  **  0.133 ***  0.045 *  -0.014   -0.077 ***  -0.088 ***  0.812 
  (1.125)   (0.093)    (0.029)   (0.023)   (0.034)   (0.020)   (0.026)    
Food  1.273   -0.148  **  -0.028   0.005   0.030   -0.001   -0.006   -0.502 
  (0.868)   (0.069)    (0.022)   (0.006)   (0.026)   (0.007)   (0.010)    
Textiles  -2.666   0.194    0.013   -0.039 ***  0.138 ***  -0.097 ***  -0.015   -0.351 
  (3.422)   (0.281)    (0.019)   (0.012)   (0.026)   (0.012)   (0.009)    
Timber  -9.863 **  0.761  **  -0.032   0.061 ***  0.144 ***  -0.061 ***  -0.111 ***  -1.057 
  (3.837)   (0.332)    (0.024)   (0.014)   (0.034)   (0.016)   (0.016)    
Petroleum  4.384 **  -0.237    -0.029   -0.037 **  -0.109 *  -0.015   0.190 ***  1.442 
  (2.049)   (0.159)    (0.034)   (0.016)   (0.060)   (0.010)   (0.069)    
Chemical  -2.140   0.150    -0.020 *  -0.004   0.144 ***  -0.046 ***  -0.074 ***  -0.340 
  (1.377)   (0.115)    (0.012)   (0.005)   (0.020)   (0.013)   (0.014)    
Rubber  -3.963 **  0.313  **  -0.040   0.008   0.077   -0.003   -0.042 *  -0.155 
  (1.998)   (0.156)    (0.035)   (0.018)   (0.049)   (0.021)   (0.025)    
Non metal  -0.128   -0.015    0.029 **  0.001   0.064 ***  -0.024 **  -0.070 ***  -0.293 
  (0.890)   (0.081)    (0.011)   (0.006)   (0.017)   (0.010)   (0.012)    
Metal  -3.891 **  0.300  **  -0.021   -0.043 ***  0.161 ***  -0.068 ***  -0.029   -0.124 
  (1.959)   (0.150)    (0.022)   (0.009)   (0.036)   (0.020)   (0.023)    
Machinery  1.799   -0.089    -0.010   -0.001   0.053 **  -0.031 ***  -0.011 *  0.704 
  (2.115)   (0.162)    (0.019)   (0.009)   (0.024)   (0.007)   (0.006)    
Other  4.351 ***  -0.381  ***  0.005   -0.013   -0.037   0.086 **  -0.040   -0.003 
  (1.297)    (0.119)     (0.048)    (0.024)    (0.059)    (0.038)    (0.049)     
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Table 6: Aggregate Effects of Electricity Scarcity from 1999 to 2004 
 
Panel A: Effect on Production Costs 




Total effect on 
cost, 2000-04 
(bill. yuan) 
% of sample 
total costs,  
2000-2004 
Average Calculation 









Factor biased effects  283  0.00  1,580  8.93% 
Capital  -1.2    -7  -0.04% 
Labor  13.7    76  0.43% 
Materials  313    1,750  9.89% 
Electricity  -56.6    -317  -1.79% 
Non-electric energy  14.1    79  0.44% 
Overall effects  70.4  0.23  393  2.22% 
 
Enterprise-level  
       
Factor neutral effects  -10    -275  -1.55% 
Factor biased effects  274    3,840  21.69% 
Overall effects  264    3,570  20.17% 
 











% of sample 







0.91  -4,173  -0.13% 
      Electric power  -708  0.70  -3,943  -0.12% 







Total effects  -29    -342,000  -10.70% 
     Electric power  -1    -28,900  -0.90% 








Figure 1: Annual Average Thermal Utilization Rate by Grid, 1999-2004 
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